


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DIRECTORATE OF
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WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

The Indian-Pakistani Arms Race

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THE INDIAN-PAKISTANI ARMS RACE

Since the end of the September War of 1965, both India and Pakistan have significantly increased their fighting strength. New units have been added to the order of battle, and both nations have obtained or ordered more military equipment from abroad. Most combat losses of the war were made up long ago, and the emphasis now may be shifting from expansion to modernization.

Despite Pakistani gains--probably temporary--in a few areas such as fighter aircraft, India has generally been able to maintain its superiority in forces likely to be used in any Indo-Pakistani war. India not only has further increased its absolute strength more than Pakistan, but appears more capable of continuing the expansion and modernization.

Until relations between the two states improve substantially, it is unlikely that their arms race--a manifestation of deeply ingrained political problems--will be halted or even significantly slowed. Each country is aware of and probably exaggerates the other's military build-up, giving new impetus to the race. Only a shortage of funds and the difficulty of getting arms abroad appear to be limiting factors.

The September War

The September War led both Rawalpindi and New Delhi to conclude that their armed forces were inadequate. By mid-September 1965, the entire Pakistani Army--except for one weak, isolated division in East Pakistan--had been committed to battle. India, however, still had two divisions--the 9th and the 14th--available to reinforce the troops then threatening to break the Pakistani lines in the Punjab in two places. An additional seven Indian divi-

sions deployed against what the Pakistanis viewed as a largely imaginary Chinese threat, and a division engaged in suppressing a tribal rebellion in the Nagaland portion of eastern India conceivably also could have been thrown into the war.

With the Pakistani Army stretched to the breaking point in West Pakistan, with East Pakistan all but defenseless, and with ten Indian divisions still uncommitted, it was obvious in Rawalpindi that Pakistan needed a larger army.

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The military situation looked quite different from New Delhi's viewpoint. Indian forces had successfully contained Pakistani infiltrators in Kashmir, had stopped a Pakistani attack in the southern part of that state, and had driven a short way into the Pakistani Punjab. A Chinese Communist move, however, in eastern Kashmir--where India had only one division--could turn these limited, costly victories into a major disaster.

In Eastern India, only the six divisions normally deployed against China would be available to meet an attack from the north. The 9th Division, normally available as a reserve, had to watch enemy forces in East Pakistan, and the other potential reserve divisions in central and southern India had already moved toward the Punjab. Reports of increased Pakistani aid to the rebels in Nagaland indicated that New Delhi might have to send more troops to that troubled state. With increased Chinese patrolling on the border and a steady stream of official Chinese protests, it was obvious to India that it had too few troops to meet all its commitments.

Shortages and Supply

When fighting ended on 22 September 1965, the first task facing both sides was the replacement of combat losses. Although India had suffered more casualties and possibly had lost more equipment, its larger military estab-

lishment was better able to absorb the losses, and it had greater reserves of equipment and spare parts. Moreover, India's armament industry--although small--was able to supply some of the army's needs, particularly ammunition, and the USSR, which had become India's major source of arms, continued military shipments.

Pakistan faced much more serious problems. Rawalpindi had relied almost exclusively on US military aid, and in early September the US not only halted the aid program, but also banned the sale of military supplies to the subcontinent. Most other Western nations followed suit, although some relaxed their bans in the winter and spring of 1966. Muslim nations--particularly Iran, Turkey, and, before the October 1965 coup, Indonesia--have given Pakistan limited help, and Iranian purchases in Western Europe have helped relieve critical shortages of spare parts and ammunition. For much of its new equipment, however, Pakistan turned to Communist China, the only nation apparently both able and willing to provide substantial quantities in a short time.

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